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Abstract 
Events consist of diverse elements, each processed in specialised neocortical 
networks, with temporal lobe memory systems binding these elements to form 
coherent event memories. We provide a novel theoretical analysis of an unexplored 
consequence of the independence of memory systems for elements and their bindings, 
one that raises the paradoxical prediction that schema-driven false memories can act 
solely on the binding of event elements despite the superior retrieval of individual 
elements.  This is because if two, or more, schema-relevant elements are bound 
together in unexpected conjunctions, the unexpected conjunction will increase 
attention during encoding to both the elements and their bindings, but only the 
bindings will receive competition with evoked schema-expected bindings.  We test 
our model by examining memory for object-location bindings in recognition (Study 1) 
and recall (Studies 2 and 3) tasks.  After studying schema-relevant objects in 
unexpected locations (e.g. pan on a stool in a kitchen scene), participants who then 
viewed these objects in expected locations (e.g. pan on stove) at test were more likely 
to falsely remember this object-location pairing as correct, compared to participants 
that viewed a different unexpected object-location pairing (e.g. pan on floor).  In 
recall, participants were more likely to correctly remember individual schema-
relevant objects originally viewed in unexpected, as opposed to expected locations, 
but were then more likely to misplace these items in the original room scene to 
expected places, relative to control schema-irrelevant objects.  Our theoretical 
analysis and novel paradigm provide a tool for investigating memory distortions 
acting on binding processes.   
 
Keywords: Schema; False memories; Source memory; Scene memory; 
Distinctiveness effects; Object-location binding  
 3 
Out of Place, Out of Mind: Schema-driven False Memory Effects for Object-
Location Bindings 
 Witnessed events involve interactions between agents, objects, locations, 
evoked emotions and actions, all within a temporal context. Current models of 
memory emphasize this distributed nature of event representations. These individual 
aspects of events are processed by different brain systems and retained as somewhat 
independent units, in addition to being bound together to form an episodic memory, a 
function attributed to the hippocampus within medial temporal lobe memory systems 
(Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010; Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014; McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995, Rolls & Treves, 1998). 
Another fundamental aspect of remembering events is that they are processed 
within existing knowledge frameworks, including event schemas, which affect both 
the interpretation of the event and how attention is allocated (Bartlett, 1932; Graesser, 
Gordon & Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski & Smith, 1980; Schank, 1982, 
1999). When accurate memory for witnessed events is required, systematic distortions 
can occur due to these relations between established knowledge and the event that 
was experienced.  A combination of lower levels of processing of schema-relevant 
stimuli (Schank, 1982, 1999), activations of neural representations of non-present 
schema-relevant items due to their associative links within schema knowledge 
structures during encoding (Gallo, 2010; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Mitchell & Johnson, 2009), together with expectations that such items would have 
been present in the to-be-remembered material (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999), all 
potentially lead to inaccurate memories.  False positives for schema-relevant items 
can arise due to source confusions for activations (associatively activated as opposed 
to actually present in the to-be-remembered material), combined with lower 
thresholds for accepting schema-relevant items as having been present. In addition, 
memory for details of schema-relevant items that were actually present may be poor 
due to low levels of processing for schema-relevant material (Mäntylä & Bächman, 
1992; Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989).   
The converse of these processes occurs when a schema-irrelevant item is 
observed in that it attracts attention, leading to detailed processing and accurate 
memory, with the important caveat that the proportion of such schema-irrelevant 
items in stimuli should remain relatively low (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992). Moreover, 
metamemorial thresholds for accepting that schema-irrelevant items were present in 
to-be-remembered material are high, leading to low levels of false memories 
(Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 1991; Mäntylä & Bächman, 1992; Pezdek et al., 
1989; Schacter et al., 1999). Thus, we are unlikely to remember the exact phrases 
used by a waiter asking us what we want to eat in a restaurant (schema-relevant) but 
much more likely to remember the details of the words used if the waiter asked us 
instead what our favourite color was (schema-irrelevant). It is also very unlikely that 
we would falsely remember that we were asked what our favorite color was, whereas 
we may falsely remember we were asked what we wanted for dessert. The term 
distinctiveness effects will be used as a summary term to refer to these attentional and 
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metamemorial processes making schema-irrelevant items more memorable and less 
prone to false recollection and schema-relevant items more prone to false recollection. 
 An interesting aspect of the large literature investigating systematic memory 
distortions due to schemas has been a focus on memory for individual elements of a 
person description, narrative, scene or event, rather than how constituent elements are 
bound together, a gap we address in the present research using a novel paradigm. 
Consonant with distinctiveness effects, the findings across the domains of social 
stereotypes (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992), narratives 
(Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Graesser et al., 1979, 1980; Lampinen, Faries, 
Neuschatz, & Toglia, 2000, Nakamura & Graesser, 1985), room scenes (Brewer & 
Treyens, 1981; Lampinen et al., 2001; Mäntylä & Bächman, 1992; Pezdek et al., 
1989), filmed events (Aizpurua, Garcia-Bajos, & Migueles, 2009; Garcia-Bajos & 
Migueles, 2003; Migueles & García-Bajos, 1999; Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, 
Hawkins, & Toglia, 2002; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003; Yamada & Itsukushima, 2013a, 
2013b) and real events (Nakamura, Graesser, Zimmerman, & Riha, 1985) has been 
that although true memory performance for schema-relevant elements is high, false 
memories for schema-relevant foils or intrusions are also high. In contrast, schema-
irrelevant items show high levels of true memory combined with low levels of false 
memory, as long as the proportion of schema-irrelevant items is not too great, 
potentially attenuating schema evocation (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992).   
When the focus of research attention is on the binding between elements, a 
hitherto unexplored consequence of the independence of memory for individual 
elements relative to binding of those elements (Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014; 
McClelland et al., 1995, Rolls & Treves, 1998) could be that schema-driven false 
memory effects act solely on the binding between elements, as we elaborate below.  
In forensic contexts witnesses are not only required to recall individual aspects of an 
event, such as whether a particular person was present, but also where the person was, 
what they were doing, and with what objects (Howe & Knott, 2015).  Whether 
threatening language was used by a slight or burly individual in a group during a 
witnessed altercation, or whether a kitchen knife was seen on the floor, table or in its 
usual holder prior to a crime could be important within a legal context.  Thus, it is of 
practical as well as scientific interest to understand how schemas can affect accuracy 
of memory for the binding between elements. 
If the focus of interest is to isolate schematic distortion effects acting on the 
binding between elements, it is necessary to consider a situation where all the 
individual elements of that situation are schema-relevant and only the linkage 
between two or more elements is schema-unexpected.  An example can be observed 
in the top panel of Figure 1 where a teapot is placed on a stool in a kitchen scene. In 
our proposed model, the unexpected linkage attracts attention (as predicted by 
distinctiveness effects) but also associatively evokes schematically-expected bindings 
(teapot on work-surface and perhaps person on stool).  The counterintuitive prediction 
that emerges from these processes is that memory for the individual elements will be 
enhanced (e.g., the teapot and stool), because of the attention they received, as well as 
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because of the evocation of the schematically-expected bindings that will necessarily 
involve the individual elements. However, memory for the unexpected binding may 
be impaired, due to competition from the evoked schematically-expected bindings 
(e.g., teapot on stool versus teapot on work-surface). A source memory error may 
occur because a strong but implausible memory trace is competing with a weaker, 
associatively evoked, but more plausible memory trace. This prediction differs from 
the traditional view of distinctiveness effects, whereby both memory for the 
distinctive item and contextual detail should be enhanced, as no distinction is made 
between individual elements and their bindings (Lampinen et al., 2001; Schank, 1982, 
1999). 
In order to test for schema-driven effects acting specifically on the binding 
between elements, it is necessary to present target stimuli with schema-unexpected 
bindings at study and then in one test situation, present the schema-expected binding 
while in another to present a different schema-unexpected binding. Any difference in 
performance in terms of judging whether the binding between elements was present in 
the original material can be ascribed to schema-driven distortions.  Whether the 
difference can be accounted for by the competition we suggest is occurring between 
actual and evoked bindings between elements and/or by guessing biases towards 
endorsing schema-expected bindings as correct is an issue that is addressed in depth 
in our series of studies.  
 We decided to operationalize the paradigm suggested by the analysis 
presented above using object-location bindings within schematic scenes. This is 
because the brain systems underlying independent object and location memory, as 
well as object-location bindings, are well defined (see reviews in Byrne, Becker, & 
Burgess, 2007; Knierim, Lee & Hargreaves, 2006; Lew, 2011; Postma, Kessels, & 
van Asselen, 2008; Torralba, Oliva, Castelhano, & Henderson, 2006). The 
effectiveness of schematic rooms with respect to schema-driven distortions on object 
memory within the rooms has been robustly demonstrated (Brewer & Teyens, 1981; 
Friedman, 1979; Lampinen, et al., 2001; Mäntylä & Bächman, 1992; Pezdek et al., 
1989).  With regard to placement of items in schema-evoking scenes, studies by 
Mandler and Parker (1976) and Hess and Slaughter (1990), in which participants had 
to remember the spatial arrangement of items in a schematically logical or scrambled 
scene (e.g., of a kitchen), showed that errors tend to occur in the direction of schema-
expected object placements, thus indicating schema-driven distortions for placement 
of items. In visual search paradigms, schematic scene knowledge guides visual 
attention during search for target items within scenes e.g. directing vision to floor 
areas when searching for shoes (Hollingworth, 2009; Torralba et al., 2006). 
Pezdek et al. (1989; also Mäntylä & Bächman, 1992) and Lampinen et al. 
(2001) studied memory for objects in a room (graduate student office) in relation to 
schema relevance.  The room contained items that were schema-relevant (office 
items) as well as those that were schema-irrelevant (toys).  On tests of recall and 
recognition, participants showed more false memories for schema-relevant than 
schema-irrelevant items that had not been present at study, as well as exhibiting high 
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levels of true memories for schema-irrelevant items.  Lampinen et al. (2001) found 
that memories for schema-relevant items, whether true or false, attracted more 
“know” as opposed to “remember” responses from participants, where a “know” 
response indicates a sense of familiarity but without distinctive details, thus indicating 
that high true memory performance for schema-relevant items does not necessarily 
reflect strong memory traces.  
 In the current research, we use photographs of schema-evoking rooms 
(bathroom, kitchen, living room, and office) that contain target objects that belong 
within the schema, as well as many other additional schema-relevant objects and 
features.  The target schema-relevant objects are present either at expected or 
unexpected locations.  Target schema-irrelevant objects are also present, that is 
objects that do not belong within the schema for the room scene (e.g., a doll in the 
kitchen scene, Figure 1 top panel).  After study of the scene, and following a 
distractor task, a test scene is shown where target objects have either remained in 
place or have shifted location.  Additionally, schema-relevant foil objects not present 
at study are added, either at schema-expected or schema-unexpected locations, 
together with further schema-irrelevant objects.  Participants have to indicate whether 
they think a target object was present in the place shown when originally presented. 
Two between-subjects conditions were used, with the only difference between 
conditions being that in one condition, a target schema-relevant object originally in an 
unexpected location, e.g., teapot on a stool in the kitchen scene, is shifted to an 
expected location at test, e.g., teapot on the work-surface, whereas in another 
condition it is shifted to a different unexpected location, e.g., teapot on foot-shelf of 
table (Figure 1). 
The critical prediction we make following our analysis of schema-driven false 
memory effects targeted on the binding between elements is that performance will be 
reliably lower (more false memories) for objects shifted from unexpected to expected 
locations compared to objects shifted from unexpected to different, but still 
unexpected, locations.  Note that this prediction is different to that arising from 
distinctiveness effects as traditionally formulated which do not take into account the 
potential separation between elements and their bindings.  The traditional prediction 
would be that the initial unexpected location for the object would lead to high levels 
of true memory for the original location in both conditions, due to the distinctive 
object-location combination being attended to. 
It is important to demonstrate that having an object that belongs to a schematic 
scene in an unexpected location does indeed give rise to distinctiveness effects in 
terms of memory for that object, as this has yet to be demonstrated within the scene 
memory paradigm.  We thus predict that for non-shifted objects, the characteristic 
pattern of high true memories and low false memories for schema-irrelevant objects 
that has been obtained in most prior research (Lampinen et al., 2001; Mäntylä & 
Bächman, 1992; Pezdek et al.; 1989) will also occur in our study, and the same 
pattern of effects will occur for the schema-relevant objects in unexpected locations. 
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Conversely, high levels of true memories combined with high levels of false 
memories are predicted for schema-relevant objects in expected locations.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were first year psychology students gaining partial course credit 
for research participation.  There were 20 participants in the shift-to-expected 
condition (19 females, mean age = 19.2 years, range 18-29 years) and 20 in the shift-
to-unexpected condition (16 females, mean age = 20 years, range 18-40 years). 
Because this is a novel paradigm, we based our sample size on prior piloting for the 
between-subjects comparison. For the within-subjects factors, a sample size of 40 is 
comparable to the samples used in prior research (Lampinen et al., 2001; Pezdek et 
al., 1989). The study was approved by the University Ethics Committee and 
conformed to British Psychological Society and American Psychological Association 
ethical guidelines. 
Stimuli. 
The main stimuli used in the experiment were color digital photographs of 4 
different room environments: bathroom, kitchen, living room, and office (each 
photograph was standardized to 1300 x 864 pixels).  Associated with each room were 
12 target objects (see Table 1). There were 12 possible versions of each photograph of 
each room, only one of which was viewed by each participant during initial study of 
each room photograph. Each version of each photograph used for initial study by 
participants had 2 possible associated test photographs. Figure S1 shows the exact 
scheme used to create the different versions of each room photograph, and the 
rationale for the different versions is explained in the Design section below. 
  In order to familiarize participants to the requirements of the task, a single 
photograph of a 5th environment, a seminar room, was used.  An associated test 
photograph of this study image was constructed in which one of two target objects 
remained in place, the second object was moved, and a new target object was also 
added to this test image.  Target objects were circled.  The practice images were 
laminated, together with a laminated printed sheet containing the test question in large 
bold font i.e., “was this object in this place before”.  This question remained next to 
the computer used to present the stimuli in the actual study so that participants did not 
have to remember the test question while responding in test phases. Other than the 
practice materials that were printed and laminated, the study was conducted using 
PsyScript (Slavin, 2003-14) running on a 15.4 inch MacBook Pro laptop.  The stimuli 
and script are available on request from the authors. 
Two normative studies were conducted to check both the schema relevance of 
the target objects selected for each room scene and the expectedness of object 
placements within the scenes.  In the first study, 12 participants who were university 
undergraduates or postgraduates (5 females, mean age 22.3 years, range 18-27 years) 
 8 
rated the schema-relevance of each of the 12 objects associated with each of the 4 
rooms on a scale of 1 (very usual) to 10 (very unusual). The objects were 
photographed individually in canonical orientations with background removed using 
GIMP (free picture editing software, http://www.gimp.org).  The means and SDs of 
the ratings for each object are displayed in Table 1.  The mean typicality ratings for 
all schema-expected objects were below 3 and all typicality ratings for schema-
irrelevant objects were above 5, the only exceptions being the doll and bed pillow for 
the living room, and the kettle for the office. For the bed pillow, the cause of the 
ratings may have been the confusability of the image with a cushion, which was not 
an issue when the object was seen in the living room context and relative size could 
be gauged.  The effect of having these few objects with low atypicality ratings may be 
to weaken differences between types of objects, thus leading to more conservative 
effects. 
In the second normative study, 12 undergraduate and postgraduate participants 
(9 females, mean age 20.5yrs, range 18-26 years) rated the expectedness of the 
location of the schema-consistent objects on a scale of 1 (very usual) to 10 (very 
unusual). The means and SDs of these ratings are also presented in Table 1.  All 
means for the schema-expected locations were between 1-3 and all means for the 
unexpected locations were above 5, the only exceptions being the paper lamp on the 
mantel-piece in the living-room scene and the desk-chair at the table in the office 
scene. The ratings for these 2 object-location pairings were still higher in terms of 
being considered more unusual than the ratings for the schema-expected locations 
however. 
Design.  
Figure 2 illustrates the design of Study 1 in terms of types of objects (schema 
relevant or irrelevant) present in each of 4 scenes (bathroom, kitchen, living room, 
office), whether they were target objects present during study, or foils only present 
during a recognition test, whether the target objects were studied in expected, 
unexpected or irrelevant locations, and whether the target objects shifted or remained 
in place between study and test. A mixed design was employed. The between-subjects 
factor was that of condition, whereby in the shift-to-expected condition one schema-
consistent object in each room that was initially in an unexpected location was shifted 
to an expected location.  In the shift-to-unexpected condition, the same object was 
shifted to a different unexpected location.  It was necessary to make this a between-
subjects factor so that the same objects within the same contexts could be compared 
purely in terms of where they were moved to in test photographs, something which 
would not be possible in a fully within-subjects design.  
Within-subject independent variables were the initial location of objects 
(schema-expected, unexpected, or irrelevant for schema-irrelevant objects) and 
whether the objects were present at study or not. Two different dependent variables 
were analyzed.  The first research question concerned whether levels of true and false 
memories for non-shifted objects would vary as a function of location, in order to 
ascertain whether a schema-relevant object in an unexpected location shows similar 
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distinctiveness effects to those obtained in prior research for schema-irrelevant objects 
(Lampinen et al., 2001; Pezdek et al., 1989).  The proportion of Yes responses to the 
question, “was this object in this place before”, was used as the dependent variable 
and only the non-shifted objects were used in the analysis.  Proportions were used for 
the total number of schema-relevant objects that were in expected locations across the 
4 rooms, calculated out of a total possible 4. This was the same for the total number of 
schema-relevant objects in unexpected locations and the total number of schema-
relevant objects only present in test images, either at expected or unexpected 
locations.  However, there were 8 schema-irrelevant objects in total (2 per room) that 
did not shift between test and study images. There were 9 schema-irrelevant objects (3 
per room) that were not present at study but were present in test images.  The reason 
for this imbalance was so that we could have equal numbers of schema-relevant and 
schema-irrelevant target objects per room as in previous research (Lampinen et al., 
2001; Pezdek et al., 1989).  A 2(Condition) x 3(Location) x 2(Present at Study) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the dependent variable proportion of Yes responses 
(correct response for objects present at study, and incorrect for foils) was conducted to 
investigate true and false memories as a function of object type and location. 
The second dependent variable was the proportion of correct responses to the 
question, “was this object in this place before”, where only shifted objects were 
analyzed.  Note that the correct response was always “no”.  To address the question of 
whether there was a difference across conditions in the proportion of correct 
responses to shifts in schema-relevant objects originally in unexpected locations, a 
2(Condition) x 3(Location) mixed ANOVA was performed on the proportion of 
correct responses for shifted objects. 
For all analyses, tests of significance were 2-tailed, and a p-value of < .05 was 
used to reject the null hypothesis.  The Greenhouse-Geisser correction for unequal 
variances was applied where relevant in all analyses.  
As outlined in the Stimuli section, 12 different versions of each of the 4 room 
scenes were constructed to counterbalance which irrelevant objects were present 
(either those numbered 7.-9. or 10.-12. in Table 1), which unexpected locations were 
used (list 1 or 2 in Table 1), and which of the schema-relevant objects took the role of 
being in expected, unexpected or not present locations (2 objects in each of these roles 
in each photograph). Additionally, in order to counterbalance which of the 2 schema-
relevant objects in each role remained in place (one version) or shifted (the second 
version; shifting from list 1 to list 2 locations or vice versa), each study version of the 
scene was paired with one of 2 test photographs. Finally, in test photographs, which 
irrelevant object shifted out of the possible 3 was counterbalanced, as well as which 
schema-relevant foil was located in an expected or unexpected location in the test 
photograph (see Figure S1 for exact scheme used to derive different scene versions). 
The top panel of Figure 1 displays version 2 (see Figure S1) of the kitchen, 
with one of the two associated test photographs shown in the middle panel.  In this 
example schema-relevant target objects in expected places at study are the pan and 
toaster, those in unexpected places are microwave and teapot, and those not present 
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are fruit-bowl and kitchen roll. The walking boots, bath towel and doll serve as the 
irrelevant target objects.  In the test image, the toaster shifts from the work-surface to 
an unexpected location on the floor, the teapot shifts from the stool to an expected 
place on the work-surface and the bath towel shifts from the table rail to the back of 
the stool.  The kitchen roll is added as a foil in an expected location (work-surface to 
the right of the sink), and the fruit-bowl is added as a foil in an unexpected location 
(foot-shelf of table). Three further irrelevant objects are also added as foils (pile of 
books, umbrella and hat). The only difference between test photographs in each 
condition was in the single schema-relevant object in each room initially seen in an 
unexpected location that then shifted to an expected location (shift-to-expected 
condition) or shifted to a different unexpected location (shift-to-unexpected) in the 
test photograph (Figure S1). In the example in Figure 2, the teapot would shift to the 
foot-shelf of table instead of the work surface in the shift-to-unexpected condition, 
with all other target objects and foils being the same between conditions. 
Procedure. 
The task consisted of a study phase, followed by a distractor task, followed by 
a recognition memory test. Participants were instructed that they would be presented 
with 4 scenes for 12 seconds each and then be tested on their memory for that scene.  
Following a 30s distractor task after the presentation of one of the scenes, participants 
were presented with a test scene, where objects would be highlighted in turn, and they 
would be required to press either the Y key for “Yes” or the N key for “No” in answer 
to the memory question, “was this object in this place before”.  During training, it was 
made clear that a “no” answer could be based on lack of memory for the object itself 
or a judgement that the object had been present but in a different location. When 
participants were ready, they could press the return key to advance to the next scene.  
The process was rehearsed using the laminated and printed training image of a 
seminar room in which a potted plant, desk, exercise machine, and kettle were used as 
target objects, each of which was circled in a test image. The task lasted 
approximately 10 minutes in total.  The distractor task was a reaction time task in 
which participants had to press any key in response to a target animal appearing on 
the screen (e.g., cat) amidst distractor animals (e.g., hippopotamus, giraffe, and frog).  
During presentation of test scenes, there was a 0.5s interval between the participant 
pressing the Y or N key and the next object being highlighted. Responses (Y or N 
key-presses) to the relevant image and circled target objects were recorded 
automatically as part of the PsyScript program. 
 The order in which the four room scenes were presented was pseudo-
randomized so that each room appeared once only.  There was random selection for 
each participant as to which version of the study scene was presented, followed by 
random selection of which associated test scene was presented (see Table 1 and 
Figure S1).  The order in which each of the 12 objects in each test scene was 
highlighted for participants to respond to was also pseudo-randomized and each 
object was only highlighted once.  On completion of the task, participants were 
thanked and debriefed.  
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Results 
 Accuracy of memory for non-shifted objects as a function of location. 
 Figure 3 shows the means (and SEs) for percentage of Yes responses as a 
function of whether the objects were present at study and whether they were in 
schema expected, unexpected, or irrelevant locations.  In order to address the question 
of whether schema-relevant objects in unexpected locations demonstrate similar 
distinctiveness effects to those found in earlier research with schema-irrelevant 
objects (Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Lampinen et al., 1991; Mäntylä & Bächman, 1992; 
Pezdek et al., 1989), a mixed 2(Condition) x 2(Study: present, absent) x 3(Location: 
expected, unexpected, irrelevant) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of Yes 
responses.  Only the objects present at study that remained in their original locations, 
and the objects added in as foils in test photographs, were included in the analysis. 
 As expected, there was no significant main effect and no significant 
interaction effects involving the between-subjects factor of condition.  Participants in 
both conditions experienced the same stimuli in terms of non-shifted objects.  There 
was a main effect of location, driven by the far higher false memory rates for schema-
relevant objects in expected locations, F(1.6, 59.6) = 27.1, p < .0001, η2p = .42, and a 
main effect of study, whereby the proportion of Yes responses was far higher for 
objects present at study versus foils, F(1, 38) = 431.6, p < .0001, η2p = .92.  As 
predicted, there was a significant interaction between location and study, F(1.6, 61.4) 
= 23.2, p < .0001, η2p = .92.  Planned contrasts demonstrated that this effect was due 
to the predicted higher level of false memories for schema-relevant objects presented 
in expected locations at test, relative to schema-relevant objects presented at 
unexpected locations, t(39) = 5.8,  p < .0001, mean difference = 35.6%, 95% CI [23.1, 
48.2], d = .9, and also relative to schema-irrelevant objects, t(39) = 8.1, p < .0001, 
mean difference = 38.3%, 95% CI [29.8, 47.3], d = 1.3.  There was no reliable 
difference between levels of false memories for schema-relevant objects in 
unexpected locations and schema-irrelevant objects (p = .5).  There were no reliable 
differences between levels of true memories for schema-relevant objects at expected 
or unexpected locations, or these objects and schema-irrelevant objects. 
 Accuracy of memory for shifted objects as a function of location. 
Figure 4 shows the means (and SEs) for percentage of correct responses as a 
function of whether the objects were originally present at study in schema expected, 
unexpected, or irrelevant locations, before being shown in different locations in the 
test photograph.  In order to address the question of whether schema-driven false 
memory effects are detectible for object-location bindings, a 2(Condition) x 
3(Location) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of accurate responses.  There 
was no reliable main effect for condition (p = .5).  There was a significant main effect 
of location, F(1.6, 62.2) = 8.1, p = .002, η2p = .12, driven by the predicted significant 
interaction between Condition x Location, F(1.6, 62.2) = 3.9, p = .03, η2p = .09. Here, 
there was a higher level of false memories for schema-relevant objects moved from 
unexpected to expected locations, relative to unexpected-to-different-unexpected 
shifts.  Planned contrasts confirmed this pattern of results with the only significant 
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difference between conditions at each location being in the comparison of objects that 
were originally in unexpected locations, t(38) = 2.3, p = 0.03, mean difference = 
18.8%, 95% CI [35.6, 1.9], d = .7. 
Discussion 
 Consistent with prior research using real schema-inducing room environments 
(Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Lampinen et al., 2001; Mäntylä & Bächman, 1992; Pezdek 
et al., 1989), we obtained high levels of both true and false memories for schema-
consistent objects in expected locations, together with high levels of true memories 
coupled with low levels of false memories for schema-irrelevant items, as predicted 
by distinctiveness effects.  Thus, the use of photographic stimuli did not act to reduce 
these effects (see also discussion in Pezdek et al., 1989).  Our results also demonstrate 
that a schema-relevant object in an unexpected location seems to attract similar levels 
of attention as schema-irrelevant objects because there was no difference in the levels 
of true and false memories between consistent objects in unexpected locations and 
irrelevant objects.  Despite this “pop-out” effect for schema-relevant objects in 
unexpected locations, there were higher levels of false memories for the location of 
these objects when seen in schema-expected locations at test, relative to seeing these 
objects in different unexpected locations.  This result was predicted by our analysis of 
schema-driven false memory effects acting on binding between elements, due to 
evoked schema-expected bindings leading to source memory confusions,  acting 
independently of memory for the elements in isolation. 
 An alternative account for the pattern of results obtained for the shifted 
objects cannot be ruled out however, one based on analyses of data utilizing an 
adaptation of the source memory paradigm (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Johnson et 
al., 1993).  Typically in these paradigms, participants study items linked to at least 
two different sources (e.g., two lists of behaviors associated with two different 
individuals such as a skinhead and a priest; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999) and are then 
required to identify items as old or new from a set including foils, followed by a 
judgement as to the source of the item if identified as old. Some studies (Bayen & 
Kuhlmann, 2011; Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000, Experiment 1; Konopka 
& Benjamin, 2009; Mather, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1999) obtain a misattribution 
bias whereby stereotypically inconsistent pairings are misattributed to the consistent 
source (e.g., a prosocial behavior originally linked to the skinhead is misremembered 
as belonging to the priest) but often no schema-driven source misattribution bias is 
found (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Cook et al., 2003, Experiment 2; Hicks & 
Cockman, 2003; Kleider, Pezdek, Goldinger & Kirk, 2008; Kuhlmann, Vaterrodt, & 
Bayen, 2012, Experiment 1). Bayen and Kuhlman (2011) argue that null effects are 
due to participants being aware of the equal probabilities during encoding. In studies 
where the equal probabilities are less transparent, a misattribution bias can be 
explained, using multinomial processing tree modeling of the data, by guessing biases 
only occurring in the absence of true memory for the source. Specifically, Bayen and 
Kuhlman suggest that true recall levels for the source are equal across expected and 
unexpected conjunctions, as well as neutral items if present. However, when 
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participants do not have true recall, they guess in a positively biased manner towards 
expected conjunctions (e.g., endorsing that a priest was the source of a prosocial 
behavior).1 
Following similar arguments in the recognition paradigm utilized in Study 1, it 
is possible that the level of true memory for object-location bindings across all the 
objects and locations was between 50-60% approximately, the level of accuracy 
obtained for the schema-relevant objects shifted from unexpected to expected 
locations.  Other responses constitute guesses, in the absence of actual memory for the 
original object-location pairing.  If these guesses are not biased in terms of yes/no 
responses , then levels of “no” responses (the correct response to the question “was 
this object in this place before”) would be expected to be between 70-80%, i.e., 
approximately 50% true memory for the original correct object-location pairing, plus 
25% guess for a correct “no” response. Both the shifted irrelevant objects, and the 
relevant objects shifted from one unexpected location to another, attracted 70-80% 
correct responses, which would be consonant with this veridical memory plus 
unbiased guessing account. In the case of seeing a schema-relevant object in an 
expected location at test however, a schema-driven bias towards guessing “yes” may 
occur, such that the level of correct “no” responses remains between 50-60%, due to 
veridical memory only.  Although this account contains a schema-driven effect, it 
does not depend on evoked schematically-relevant object-location bindings competing 
with memory for the unexpected binding seen during learning.  
In addition to the potential guessing biases outlined above, some of the items 
that were shifted at test will not have been processed during study, thus effectively 
being new stimuli for participants (e.g., approximately 15% failure to recognize old 
non-shifted objects, see Figure 3). There will be a bias to endorse these items as old if 
they are schema-relevant objects seen in schema-expected positions, relative to 
irrelevant objects or schema-relevant objects seen in unexpected positions, thus 
accounting for a portion of the difference between conditions. 
In order to try to distinguish the competition with the evoked expected 
bindings account from the guessing account of the results of Study 1, in Study 2 we 
devised a recall version of the task.  This version also addresses the problem of 
distinguishing object-location binding memory failures from object memory failures. 
In Study 2, exactly the same initial study stimuli were used as in Study 1, but then 
                                                
1 In terms of understanding schema-driven false memory effects acting on binding 
between elements, the source-monitoring paradigm presents a fundamental limitation 
relative to the novel paradigm we utilize in the present research. The source-
monitoring paradigm pits memory for schematically-expected bindings (e.g., “priest – 
gave up seat on the bus”) against memory for schematically-unexpected bindings 
(e.g., “priest – shoved to front of queue”).  This comparison potentially conflates two 
different mechanisms acting on memory. In the case of expected bindings, low 
attention may make both the elements and their bindings less memorable. In the case 
of unexpected bindings, only the bindings may be less memorable, due to competition 
effects as opposed to low attention, as we hypothesize. 
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participants were presented with a photograph of the room without any of the target 
objects present.  The 12 target objects were presented as icons on a side bar and 
participants were asked to select the objects they thought had been present (i.e., an 
object recognition task), and then to drag those objects to their remembered locations 
in the room (i.e., a location recall task).  If we are correct in our analysis of why 
participants show relatively high levels of false memories for unexpected object-
location bindings, then there should be a robust difference in the level of correct 
placements of schema-relevant objects originally viewed in unexpected locations, 
relative to schema-irrelevant objects, and the greater erroneous placements of the 
schema-relevant objects should be largely in expected locations.  This predicted lower 
level of correct placement of schema-relevant objects originally seen in unexpected 
locations should occur despite similar levels of object recognition such as those 
obtained for the irrelevant objects, given the similarity in distinctiveness effects 
obtained in Study 1 for the non-shifted objects between schema-relevant objects in 
unexpected places, and schema-irrelevant objects. 
Predictions concerning the schema-relevant objects originally seen in expected 
locations are more tentative in terms of object recognition.  It could be argued that 
there will be lower levels of recognition of objects that were originally in expected 
locations, relative to those in unexpected locations or schema-irrelevant objects, due 
to the lower level of processing they receive during study.  Pezdek et al. (1989) did 
find higher levels of recognition for schema-irrelevant objects relative to schema-
relevant objects when tested from a written list of objects, half of which were 
originally seen in vivo in a room scene. It is possible that when the recognition task 
does not involve exact reinstatement of the initial learning situation (e.g., a change 
from seeing the real object in a room to seeing a written label), the lower level of 
processing occurring at encoding due to schematic consistency has similar effects on 
memory performance as that found with recall tests (i.e., poorer performance for 
schema-relevant items; see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). In 
Study 2, when the objects are seen as icons in canonical orientations and the task is to 
drag the icons to remembered locations, there may be sufficient differences between 
the encoding and test situation to support a prediction of lower levels of recognition 
for schema-relevant objects originally viewed in expected locations relative to objects 
in unexpected locations, and schema-irrelevant objects.  Finally, as was found in 
Study 1, it can also be predicted that there will be higher levels of false recognition 
for schema-relevant foils relative to schema-irrelevant foils (Lampinen et al., 2001; 
Pezdek et al., 1989).   
In terms of recall of location of correctly recognized schema-relevant objects 
that were in expected locations, it can be predicted that levels of correct recall should 
be reliably lower than for the schema-irrelevant objects because of the relatively low 
level of attention given to these object-location pairings during study.  Guessing 
biases will not be particularly influential here because there are generally multiple 
possible expected locations available (e.g., a toaster may be placed on any part of the 
kitchen work-surfaces) and regardless of which one is shown, it can still be in an 
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expected location, although not necessarily in the location chosen in the photograph 
studied (e.g., the work-surface to the right of the sink).  It follows from this prediction 
that the majority of placement errors should be in schema-expected locations. 
If guessing biases can account for the findings of Study 1, then levels of recall 
for location should be similar across all categories of objects, with the majority of 
errors in the schema-relevant objects being in expected locations.  Unlike in Study 1 
where similar actual levels of recall of object-location pairings can be masked by 
guessing biases towards “yes” responses when objects are viewed in expected 
locations, when objects have to be placed in the correct location from multiple 
possibilities, guesses can be distinguished from true recall. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. 
 Participants were either first year psychology students gaining partial course 
credit for research participation, or non-psychology students from different levels of 
study at the university gaining small monetary compensation for participation.  There 
were 32 participants (26 females, mean age = 19.2 years, range 18-27 years), with a 
further two participants tested but excluded from the final sample due to technical 
problems; one with saving data and the other with a program freeze during testing. 
This sample size is comparable to recall studies in related research (Pezdek et al., 
1989). The study was approved by the University Ethics Committee and conformed to 
British Psychological Society and American Psychological Association ethical 
guidelines.  
Stimuli. 
The stimuli used in this experiment were the color digital photographs used in 
Study 1, (i.e., the original study scenes for the bathroom, kitchen, living room, and 
office). Half the participants saw one set of schema-irrelevant objects during study 
(7.-9. in Table 1) and the other half saw another set (10.-12. in Table 1).  Additionally, 
half the participants saw the unexpected locations from list 1 (see Table 1) and half 
saw the list 2 unexpected locations (Table 1).  Which of the 3 versions of the scene 
they saw in terms of the objects taking the roles of being in expected or unexpected 
locations was randomly selected for each participant (Figure S1). Stimuli were 
presented using the same PsyScript program (Slavin, 2003-14) as Study 1.  For the 
test phase however, a switch was made to a Keynote file that contained 4 slides, one 
of each room (photographs again standardized to 1300 x 864 pixels), without any of 
the 12 objects associated with that room being present.  The photographs were all 
taken on the same day with the same camera tripod position and settings as the 
relevant room photographs used in Study 1.  The individual photographs of all the 
objects (12 per room, see Table 1) used for the normative study of object schema-
consistency, were turned into icons of width 64 pixels, with varying heights to 
preserve the image height-width ratios. The object icons were placed in two rows of 6 
objects on a bar to the right of the room photograph to which they were associated.  
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The order of placement was randomized prior to testing for each participant.  Figure 1 
(bottom panel) provides an example of a kitchen slide after one participant has clicked 
and dragged on remembered objects, after viewing the photograph in the top panel of 
Figure 1. 
For the purposes of training participants on the requirements of the task, a 
practice printed and laminated photograph was used that depicted a garden scene with 
3 target objects: a football on the grass (e.g., schema-relevant object in an expected 
location), a garden gnome on top of a fence (e.g., schema-relevant object in an 
unexpected location), and a cardboard packing box (e.g., schema-irrelevant object).  A 
laminated test photograph was also used that did not contain the 3 target objects, 
where these objects were cut out and laminated individually along with a 4th object 
(e.g., a garden slide) added as a further object icon that served as a foil.  
Following the training, the room photographs were presented in PsyScript 
running on a 15.4 inch MacBook Pro laptop.  After 15s of the same distractor task 
described for Study 1, a change was made to the relevant Keynote slide by the 
experimenter while the participant looked away to a fixation point on the wall behind 
them. Once the participant had finished clicking and dragging objects to their 
remembered locations, PsyScript was used to present the next room, with the switch 
to Keynote repeated until all 4 rooms were presented.  
Design.  
 As with Study 1, the main within-subject factor was the location (expected, 
unexpected, and irrelevant) in which an object was placed in the original study image.  
Whether the object was present at study, or only present at test as an individual icon, 
was also varied.  In terms of those objects present at study, there were two dependent 
variables examined.  The first was the percentage of correctly recognized objects and 
the second was the percentage of correctly placed objects.  An analysis of erroneous 
placements was also made in terms of whether the placement was schema-expected 
(only applying to schema-relevant objects), a substitution error (e.g., a placement was 
made where another object had been in the original image), or neither of these 
categories.  Additionally, for both schema-relevant and schema-irrelevant foils 
presented as icons in test stimuli, the proportion of falsely recognized objects was 
analyzed to address the prediction that more schema-relevant objects would be falsely 
recognized than schema-irrelevant objects.  Placements of falsely recognized objects 
were also analysed into categories of schema-expectedness (for schema-relevant 
objects), substitutions, or “other”. 
 All placements were analysed and classified by a main observer (ARL) and 
also examined by an independent observer naïve to the background and hypotheses of 
the study.  In general, a categorical approach was used in terms of object placements 
(Hess & Slaughter, 1990).  The work-surfaces in the kitchen naturally segmented into 
4 zones, left and right of the sink and left and right of the stove (see Figure 1). Thus 
for an object that was originally placed to the right of the sink, all other zones would 
be considered as incorrect placements.  Other instances of natural segmentation 
occurred with table surfaces and shelves, the hearth in the living room scene, corners 
 17 
and the middle section of the bath in the bathroom scene, and left and right sides of 
the sink and cistern.  In the office scene, there was an extended desk surface along one 
wall that naturally segmented into a back, middle, and near sections based on an 
angular wall contour to accommodate windows.  For areas that had less clear 
segmentation (e.g., floor areas) for a placement to be correct it had to be adjacent to 
the correct feature near a wall (e.g., the bin to the near section of desk), or if more 
centrally placed originally (e.g., walking boots on the floor in kitchen scene), the 
placement had to be between the correct features (e.g., between table and stove for the 
boots).  All errors and their classifications are listed in Tables S1-S3.  These can be 
cross-referenced with the correct locations listed in Table 1.  Out of a total of 604 
placements, there were 6 disagreements between coders (1%).  In these instances, 
placements were borderline (e.g., the phone being placed on the boundary between 
front and middle desk segments). It was decided to retain the codings by ARL 
because they were more conservative with regard to the hypotheses in 4 out of the 6 
instances (e.g., ‘phone placement coded as correct). 
For all analyses, tests of significance were 2-tailed and a p-value of < 0.05 was 
used to reject the null hypothesis.  The Greenhouse-Geisser correction for unequal 
variances was applied where relevant in all analyses. 
Procedure. 
The task consisted of a study phase, followed by a distractor task, followed by 
a memory test.  Participants were aware that their memory for objects and their 
location in scenes would be tested.  Participants were instructed that they would be 
presented with 4 scenes for 12 seconds each..  Following a 15s distractor task after the 
presentation of one of the scenes, participants were asked to turn and look at a marked 
spot on the wall behind them.  They sat in a desk-chair so as to be able to swivel 
around quickly.  While they were not looking, the experimenter changed programs to 
the relevant room slide and then asked participants to turn back to face the laptop.  
This program change process took between 10-17s.  Because the order in which room 
scenes was presented by PsyScript was pseudo-randomized, the experimenter needed 
to sit adjacent to the participant in order to know which slide to change to for the 
memory test.  Once participants were engaged in the test phase, the experimenter read 
until the participant signalled that they had finished and were ready to continue to the 
next presentation of the next room scene. 
 Prior to the study, the procedure was rehearsed using printed and laminated 
materials (see Stimuli section above).  Participants studied the garden image, waited 
for a short interval, and were shown a photograph of the garden with the 4 target 
object icons to the right side.  Participants placed the objects they recognized.  None 
of the participants placed the slide icon and they were given feedback that there may 
be object icons in the main study that were not present originally.  Participants were 
reassured that the object icons on the right side bar were representations of the objects 
only, so when they were dragged into the room photograph in the main study, they 
would not appear to be the right size or orientation; rather, they were markers for the 
remembered location.   
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 The task took approximately 15 minutes to complete.  On completion of the 
task, participants were thanked and debriefed.   
Results 
 Correct object recognition as a function of location. 
 Figure 5 shows the means (and SEs) for percentage of correctly recognized 
objects as a function of whether they were in schema expected, unexpected, or 
irrelevant locations.  In order to address the prediction that schema-relevant objects 
studied in expected locations will be less recognized than either relevant objects in 
unexpected locations, or irrelevant objects, a within-subject ANOVA with location as 
the factor was conducted.  There was a significant effect of location, F(2, 62) = 10.44, 
p < .0001, η2p = .25.  Planned contrasts showed that the schema-relevant objects 
originally seen in expected places were more poorly recognized than schema-relevant 
objects seen in unexpected places, t(31) = 3.5, p = .001, mean difference = 13.7%, 
95% CI [5.7, 21.6], d = .6, and than schema-irrelevant objects, t(31) = 4.6, p < 0.0001, 
mean difference = 15.1%, 95% CI [8.3, 21.9], d = .8.  There was no difference in 
correct recognition levels for schema-consistent objects originally in unexpected 
locations and schema-irrelevant objects (p = .7). 
Correct location recall as a function of study location. 
Figure 5 also shows the means (and SEs) for the percentage of correctly placed 
objects following their correct recognition.  In order to address the prediction that 
there would be fewer correct placements of schema-relevant objects studied in 
unexpected locations relative to schema-irrelevant objects, a within-subject ANOVA 
was conducted with location as the factor.  There was a significant location effect, 
F(2, 62) = 5.05, p = .009, η2p = .14.  Planned contrasts indicated that the only reliable 
difference occurred in the comparison between schema-relevant objects studied in 
unexpected locations and schema-irrelevant objects, t(31) = -3.7, p = .001, mean 
difference = 13.6%, 95% CI = [6.0, 21.2], d = .6.  The difference between placement 
of schema-relevant objects studied in expected locations and schema-irrelevant 
objects was not reliable (p = .3) and there was also no reliable difference relative to 
schema-relevant objects studied in unexpected locations (p = .06), although this was 
marginal. This relatively high level of correct placement of schema-relevant objects 
originally seen in expected locations went against predictions that performance would 
be poor due to low levels of attention to such consistent bindings, a point we return to 
in the discussion. 
The types of errors made were analyzed and classified according to whether 
placements occurred to schema-expected locations for schema-relevant objects and 
also whether they represented object substitution errors.  A full list of all errors 
classified as schema-expected errors, or otherwise, is provided in Tables S1-3 as 
supplementary material.  For schema-relevant objects originally studied in expected 
locations, 77.8% of errors (28 out of a total of 36) occurred to alternative expected 
locations (Table S1).  One of the errors to a schema-expected location was also a 
substitution error.  For schema-relevant objects originally studied in unexpected 
locations, 81.4% of errors (48 out of 59) were to schema-expected locations (Table 
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S2).  Five of these errors to expected locations were also substitution errors. Of the 
remaining 11 errors to unexpected locations, 5 were substitution errors.  There were 
44 placement errors in total for the schema-irrelevant objects, 5 of which were 
substitution errors (Table S3). 
False object recognition as a function of schema-relevance of foils. 
The mean proportion of false recognition of schema-relevant foils was 23.4% 
(SE = 4.1%) with the mean proportion for irrelevant foils being 3.6% (SE = 2.6%).  
This difference was significant, F(1, 31) = 36.46, p < .0001, , η2p = .54. The large 
majority of the falsely recognized schema-relevant foils were placed in schema-
expected locations (54/60).  Otherwise, 3 placements were substitution errors and 3 
placements were to unexpected locations. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 2 demonstrate the full paradoxical effect predicted by our 
analysis of potentially independent schema-driven false memory effects acting on 
individual elements of an event and the binding between elements.  The effect of 
seeing a schema-relevant object in an unexpected location was to make the individual 
object more memorable, as evidenced by significantly higher recognition levels 
relative to schema-relevant objects seen in expected places.  Despite this greater 
memorability for the object, levels of correct placement were significantly lower than 
for the irrelevant objects, as predicted by our analysis, but not by traditional 
formulations of distinctiveness effects that do not distinguish between elements and 
their bindings (Schacter et al., 1999; Schank, 1982, 1999).  The large majority of 
errors were placements to expected locations, as predicted by our account of 
competition between the actual object-location pairings, and evoked, schematically 
expected pairings.  In addition, our results demonstrate that actual levels of true 
memory for object-location pairings are not equal across different categories of 
object, with those for irrelevant objects being higher.  Therefore it is unlikely that the 
results of Study 1 can be accounted for by postulating equal levels of true memory 
across all location categories, with guessing biases leading to differences in results, or 
from biases to endorse non-recognized objects as old. 
 One possibility that needs to be considered is that because there is a tendency 
to falsely recognize schema-relevant foils compared to irrelevant foils, some of the 
objects that were classified as having been correctly recognized may have in fact been 
guesses.  Therefore, differences in levels of correct placements between schema-
irrelevant objects and both types of schema-relevant objects could be due to the noise 
introduced by this higher level of guessing towards schema-relevant objects generally.  
Although such guessing could make some contribution to the pattern of results 
obtained, it is unlikely to be able to explain the full effect.  This is because the higher 
level of object recognition of schema-relevant objects viewed originally in unexpected 
locations should lead to better placement performance relative to schema-relevant 
objects viewed in expected locations, as guessing would be spread evenly across the 
two categories. However, this was not found. Thus, the pattern of results obtained in 
Study 2 with regard to schema-relevant objects viewed in unexpected locations is best 
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explained by schema-driven false memory effects acting independently on object-
location bindings, despite superior object memory. 
 One unexpected result was the relatively high level of correct placement of 
schema-relevant objects originally viewed in expected places.  Theoretically, we 
predicted that levels of correct placement would be lower than for schema-irrelevant 
objects due to low levels of processing and attention not only to the objects 
themselves but to the schema-expected pairing of object with location.  While a less 
counterintuitive prediction than that occurring for unexpected pairings, it is 
nevertheless a novel prediction, as prior studies have focused on distinctiveness 
effects for individual schema-relevant objects rather than bindings, for example by 
introducing token changes in objects (Mäntylä & Bächman, 1992; Pezdek et al., 
1989). It is therefore important to account for the finding of relatively good placement 
performance in the face of low levels of recognition of individual schema-relevant 
objects seen in expected locations. 
One methodological possibility that could have accounted for the relatively 
high proportion of correct placements of schema-relevant objects originally seen in 
expected places was that the locations that were used in our stimuli may have matched 
preferred default places for those items (e.g., fruit bowl on table), such that even with 
no memory component involved, those objects would be likely to be placed in those 
locations. Although for most of the schema-consistent objects there were multiple 
possible expected locations, we wondered if for a few objects this would not be the 
case and, therefore, that guesses were inflating the proportion of correctly placed 
objects originally seen in expected locations.  We addressed this issue in Study 3 by 
first of all asking a group of 12 participants to place the schema-relevant objects used 
in the study within the room photographs in locations they considered usual for those 
objects.  No memory component was involved; this normative study allowed us to 
establish if there were default locations that matched those locations used in the 
stimuli in Studies 1 and 2. A small subset of objects were identified where there was a 
match between default placements and the locations used in Studies 1 and 2. We then 
reanalyzed the data from Study 2, completely excluding the objects where default 
placements matched those used in the memory stimuli. Our expectation here was that 
all of the same effects would be found as in the analysis reported for Study 2, except 
that the level of correct placements for schema-relevant objects seen in expected 
places would now be significantly lower relative to irrelevant objects, due to the 
exclusion of guesses scored as correct for objects where the default placement 
matched the placement in the memory stimuli (e.g., fruit bowl on table). We also 
replicated Study 2 with 32 new participants, to establish the reliability of results. The 
reanalysis of Study 2 data, the new data for the replication in Study 3, and the pooled 
results, are all presented, where in all datasets the 7 objects identified in the normative 
study were excluded when deriving the dependent measures.  
Study 3 
Method 
Participants. 
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 Participants were either first year psychology students gaining partial course 
credit for research participation or students from different levels of study at the 
university gaining small monetary compensation for participation.  There were 12 
participants (9 females; mean age = 25.3 years, range 18-38 years) in the normative 
study investigating default placements of schema-consistent objects, and 32 
participants (24 females; mean age = 20.0 years, range 18-26 years) in the replication 
of Study 2. 
 Stimuli. 
 In the normative study, the same Keynote slides utilized in Study 2 were used.  
The order in which the rooms were presented in the file was pseudo-randomized and 
the order in which the objects appeared as icons on the right of the room photographs 
was randomized for each participant.  Only the 6 schema-consistent target objects 
used in Studies 1 and 2 were presented. The stimuli for the replication study were 
identical to those used in Study 2. 
 Design and Procedure. 
 In the normative study, participants were told that they would see some 
materials originally used in a memory study and that it was necessary to ascertain the 
locations at which certain objects would be placed in a room scene at a baseline level.  
They were then shown the first slide in the Keynote file in which the room 
photograph with associated schema-relevant icons was displayed.  They were asked to 
click on each of the 6 objects in turn and drag them to a location they thought was 
usual for that object.  They were reassured that the size and orientation of the object 
would look odd and that the icons were simply markers for locations.  They were 
asked to work their way sequentially through the 4 slides of the 4 different rooms and 
to signal to the experimenter when they had finished.  On completion of the study, 
they were thanked and debriefed. 
 The number of times (out of a maximum of 12) that a participant placed an 
object in the same location as that used for the expected locations in Studies 1 and 2 is 
displayed in square brackets in Table 1.  There were 7 objects where the majority of 
placements were at the same location as that used in Studies 1 and 2.  These were the 
scales, toilet brush, fruit bowl, pan, TV, painting, and ‘phone. 
 In the replication study, the design and procedure was identical to that in 
Study 2, except that the seven objects listed above were excluded completely from 
analyses when deriving proportions of correct recognition, recall, and false 
recognition. We also report a re-analysis of the Study 2 data excluding these objects, 
as well as a pooling of Study 2 and Study 3 data with these exclusions, to maximise 
the reliability and replicability of the results (a list of all placement errors for the 
replication study is provided in Tables S1-S3, where errors on the full set of objects 
are reported for completeness, although excluded objects are identified in italics). 
Results and Discussion 
 The top panel of Figure 6 displays the percentage of correctly recognised 
objects in the Study 2 reanalysis, the Study 3 replication, and the pooled data, with 
full exclusion of the 7 objects where the schema-expected locations used in the 
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memory stimuli matched default placements.  The higher level of recognition of 
schema-relevant objects in unexpected locations, as well as schema-irrelevant objects, 
relative to schema-relevant objects seen in expected locations was robustly replicated 
across the 3 datasets. For the pooled data set, a single factor ANOVA with the 3 levels 
of location was conducted on the proportion of correctly recognized objects, which 
showed a significant effect of location, F(2, 126) = 13.15, p < .0001, η2p = .17. The 
same pattern of results was obtained for the Study 2 reanalysis and Study 3 
replication, with effect sizes of .23 and .13 respectively.  Planned contrasts on the 
pooled data showed that the schema-relevant objects studied at expected locations 
were poorly recognized relative to the other two categories of objects (largest p = 
.001). There was no reliable difference between schema-relevant objects studied at 
unexpected locations and irrelevant objects (p = .18).  The same pattern of effects was 
seen in the Study 2 and Study 3 data sets. Thus, as expected, the recognition data 
remains similar to the analysis using the full set of objects used in Study 2.   
The bottom panel of Figure 6 displays the percentage of correctly recalled 
locations of objects in the Study 2 reanalysis, the Study 3 replication, and the pooled 
data, with full exclusion of the 7 objects where the schema-expected locations used in 
the memory stimuli matched default placements. In the pooled dataset there was a 
significant location effect, F(1.7, 108) = 5.76, p = .004, η2p = .09, Planned contrasts 
showed a significant difference between schema-relevant objects studied at expected 
locations and irrelevant objects, t(63) = 3.31, p = .002, mean difference = 13.79%, 
95% CI [5.47, 22.12], d = .51, as well as schema-relevant objects studied at 
unexpected locations and irrelevant objects, t(62) = 2.88, p = .006, mean difference 
10.04%, 95% CI [3.06, 17.2], d = .41.  There was no difference between the two 
schema-relevant object categories (p = .40).  Although the pattern of results was 
similar for the Study 2 reanalysis and the Study 3 replication, the location effect was 
marginally significant in both cases (p = .06 and .09 respectively, with effect sizes of 
.23 and .10), due to lower power.  
 These results suggest that levels of correct placement of schema-relevant 
objects originally seen in expected locations that was found in Study 2 may have been 
somewhat inflated by the match between baseline preferences for placing certain of 
the objects used in the study and the expected locations that we selected in the 
memory stimuli.  The levels of correct placements found in Study 3 in the light of the 
baseline data obtained in the normative study are more in keeping with predictions 
that correct placement would be relatively lower than for irrelevant objects, due to 
lower levels of processing on schema-expected object-location pairings during study 
of the room scenes.  An analysis of placement errors in the Study 3 replication (Tables 
S1-3) found that 87.5% (42/48) of erroneously placed schema-relevant objects viewed 
in expected locations were to alternative expected locations, similar to Study 2. 
The levels of correct placement for schema-relevant objects studied in 
unexpected locations remained similar to that obtained with the full set of objects in 
Study 2, with this level being significantly lower than for the schema-irrelevant 
objects, despite similar object recognition levels.  An analysis of errors in the Study 3 
 23 
replication (Table S2) showed that 82.69% (43/52) of these errors were to schema-
expected locations, again similar to Study 2.  Thus, the prediction that memory for 
object location-binding for schema-relevant objects in unexpected locations would be 
relatively low due to competition from evoked consistent bindings, has been further 
supported in Study 3. Interestingly, there was also occasional evidence of errors 
where a schema-irrelevant object was substituted by a schema-relevant object more in 
keeping with a location (e.g., the computer was placed on the desk where in fact the 
climbing shoes had originally been viewed). It is possible in such cases that a location 
evokes an object during encoding, which can then compete with the schema-irrelevant 
object-location binding. Alternatively or additionally, there may be memory that an 
unspecified object was present at that location, and then a “best-guess” is made from 
the choice of objects available. 
Finally, the levels of false memories for schema-relevant foils remained 
similar in the Study 2 reanalysis and Study 3 replication study (see Figure 7). For the 
pooled data, the difference between false recognition of schema-relevant versus 
irrelevant foils was significant, F(1, 63) = 48.5, p < 0.0001, ηp
2 = .44. For the schema-
relevant foils in the Study 3 replication, 97.9% (46/47) were to schema-expected 
locations (Table S3).  
General Discussion 
 Since the founding work of Bartlett (1932) on the multiple effects of schemata 
on the processing and remembering of new information, robust schema-driven effects 
have been established. These effects, which we summarized using the term 
distinctiveness effects, show the opposing trends of poorer memory for schema-
relevant items (with the converse of better memory for irrelevant items) due to 
automaticity of processing of relevant items, together with lower thresholds for 
accepting schema-relevant items as having been present. In this research, we 
presented a novel theoretical analysis of how distinctiveness effects can act 
independently for elements of events and their bindings. We also developed a 
paradigm to specifically measure any schema-driven false memory effects acting on 
binding between elements, whereby a change between encoding and test from an 
unexpected-to-expected binding is pitted directly against an unexpected-to-different-
unexpected change. Using this paradigm within the context of object-location 
bindings in schematic room scenes, we were able to demonstrate a robust false 
memory effect for changes to expected bindings. Our suggestion that this effect is 
driven by competition from evoked expected bindings was further strengthened in 
Studies 2 and 3 where participants showed superior recognition of items that had 
formed unexpected bindings, but relatively poor placement of those items in their 
correct locations (correct bindings), with errors occurring to schema-expected 
locations. Because recognition was similar for schema-relevant items that were in 
unexpected locations and irrelevant items, but irrelevant items were placed with 
higher accuracy, it is unlikely that our data can be explained by a model positing 
equal levels of accurate memory for object-location bindings, with schema-driven 
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guessing biases accounting for any differences in performance (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 
2011). 
 A question arises as to the generality of our model positing independent 
distinctiveness effects for elements and their bindings. Because we suggest that the 
possibility of independent distinctiveness effects arises as a consequence of the action 
of temporal lobe memory systems acting to bind together different aspects of events 
stored in separate brain systems (Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014; McClelland et al., 
1995), it should be possible to demonstrate such effects over a range of types of 
material, beyond object-location bindings. Guided by our theoretical analysis and 
results, we re-examined findings from the literature using the source-monitoring 
paradigm where schematically relevant information is presented at encoding. If 
participants are not cognizant of the actual and equal probabilities of different sources 
being correct in such studies (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011), we would expect a pattern 
of results of greater recognition of items forming unexpected bindings as being “old” 
rather than “new”, but similar levels of accurate source memory, as obtained in our 
studies, between schema-expected and schema-unexpected bindings, assuming the 
recognition task did not directly reinstate encoding conditions (as in studies 2 and 3).  
A study by Kleider and colleagues (Kleider et al., 2008) conformed to these 
design characteristics, and due to the inclusion of filler items specifically aimed at 
making the structure of the task less transparent, may have avoided artifacts due to 
participants being aware of the task structure (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011). In this 
study, participants watched short videos of two characters, a male handyman and a 
female homemaker, carrying out schema-expected actions, schema-unexpected 
actions, and neutral action fillers (e.g., drinking water). At test, after 2 minutes of 
distractor tasks, sets of actions that were originally performed by the expected or 
unexpected actor, together with foils, were presented in written form, so the 
recognition context did not reinstate learning conditions. Participants had a higher hit 
rate in terms of old/new judgements for actions that had been performed by the 
schema-unexpected actor, but there was no difference in the accuracy of their source 
memory between correctly remembered actions performed by the schema-expected 
actor versus the schema-unexpected actor. The authors found it hard to account for 
these results within existing theoretical frameworks, but they are consistent with our 
model and findings. 
Future research using a forced-choice recognition paradigm may be helpful for 
establishing whether the competition effects that we posit between the veridical 
unexpected, and associatively evoked expected, object-location bindings are occurring 
at the earliest stages of encoding, or following encoding of the veridical binding. Low 
performance when the veridical unexpected binding is present among foils may 
indicate interference at the level of encoding, rather than the more usual view of 
source memory errors as arising from associatively evoked items following encoding.2 
Eye-tracking data on how attention is being allocated during initial study of scenes 
would also provide more direct evidence for the proposed difference in attentional 
                                                
2 We thank one of our reviewers, Jason Hicks, for this suggestion. 
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capture between schema-relevant objects in expected versus unexpected locations, as 
has been successfully demonstrated for relevant versus irrelevant items within scenes 
in prior research (e.g. Loftus & Mackworth, 1978). Such data may also help to 
corroborate whether objects were scanned, however briefly, during study, providing 
more confidence in correct judgements during recognition and recall tests. 
 There has been a recent increase in theory and research concerning the brain 
systems underlying the interaction between schematic knowledge and episodic 
memory (Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013; van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernández, Henson, 
2012), with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex identified as a key region mediating 
between cortical networks thought to underpin schematic knowledge on the one hand, 
and temporal lobe (especially hippocampal) areas underpinning specific event 
memory on the other. In terms of understanding the neural basis of schema-driven 
memory distortions, Warren and colleagues (Warren, Jones, Duff, & Tranel, 2014) 
found that patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage showed unimpaired 
true memory for lists of semantically-related words relative to controls, but lower 
levels of false memories for semantically-related critical lures.  Because memory for 
items actually presented on these lists was not mediated via schemas activated during 
list presentation (i.e., in these lists, variation in associative strength from the list items 
themselves to the non-presented falsely remembered item is not correlated with true 
memory; see Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), only false recall is 
mediated by schema activation.  These findings are consistent with those of Aminoff, 
Schacter, and Bar (2008) who found that higher activation of left medial prefrontal 
cortex (as well as bilateral activation of retrosplenial and lateral parietal cortices) 
during encoding of items strongly associated with a context, was related to later false 
alarms to new items linked to the evoked context, relative to correct rejections of such 
items.  In terms of schema-unexpected bindings, Straube and colleagues (Straube, 
Meyer, Green, & Kircher, 2014) found greater activation in anterior and posterior 
cingulate cortices, as well as anterior thalamic areas, congruent with heightened 
attention and surprise reactions, relative to schema-expected bindings, for correctly 
remembered unexpected sentence-gesture pairings.  
These neuropsychological and imaging studies may be considered as 
preliminary steps to understanding the neural basis of schema evocation, as well as 
heightened attention to schema-mismatching stimuli. In the paradigms utilized in the 
present research, as well as studies such as Kleider et al. (2008), it would be expected 
that stimuli containing schema-unexpected bindings between elements would both 
highly activate cortical networks (schema evocation), ventromedial prefrontal areas, 
and lead to surprise “mismatch” reactions, potentially involving cingulate and 
thalamic areas. How the interplay between activations in these areas and temporal 
lobe systems results in either correct memory or schema-driven false memory could 
be informative in terms of further understanding schema-driven false memory effects, 
using suitably adapted paradigms for imaging research. 
 The present research may have implications for understanding vulnerabilities 
in eyewitness testimony. This is because we found a particular vulnerability for 
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remembering unexpected conjunctions of objects and locations in the face of superior 
memory for the object itself, using naturalistic scenes. It is important to extend this 
work to the complex event stimuli used in applied forensic research (e.g., Aizpurua et 
al., 2009; Migueles & García-Bajos, 1999) in order to establish whether such 
vulnerabilities could exist in potential misattributions of actions or dialogue in a 
schema-congruent fashion. Additionally, it is well known that jurors, once they have 
developed a schema for the evidence being presented in a trial, not only tend to 
remember schema-relevant information and ignore schema-irrelevant facts, but also 
frequently misremember “facts” not in evidence but that are schema-relevant  
(Huntley & Costanzo, 2003; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Of course these errors 
involve both “objects” (evidentiary “facts” ranging from words allegedly heard in a 
conversation to a “smoking gun”) and their bindings, information that has been 
previously stored in memory and activated based on trial evidence. Whether these 
objects and their schematic bindings can be dissociated in jury research contexts as 
they were in our studies is a question for subsequent research. 
 In conclusion, in this research we extend the application of distinctiveness 
effects whereby schema-irrelevant items are better remembered that schema-relevant 
items, to include the idea that distinctiveness effects can act independently on 
elements of an event and the binding between elements, a prediction derived from the 
basic science of episodic memory. In terms of object-location binding, we show that 
enhanced memory for an object viewed in an unexpected location can occur in the 
face of relatively high levels of false memories for an expected object-location 
binding. We attribute these findings to active competition from evoked expected 
bindings leading to source memory errors. 
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Table 1. 
 
Target objects and their locations within the room scenes used in studies 1, 2 & 3.  
Note. The Ms and SDs of ratings for schema-relevance (1 = very usual, 10 = very 
unusual) for each object in the relevant normative study are provided in the left-hand 
column, and the mean ratings for location expectedness for each schema-relevant 
object are provided in the 3 rightmost columns.  The numbers in bold square brackets 
represent the number of participants out of 12 that placed the schema-relevant object 
in the expected location used in studies 1 and 2 as a baseline preference in Study 3 
(see text for further details). 
 
Objects Expected 
Location 
Unexpected 
Location List 1 
Unexpected 
Location List 2 
Bathroom 
1. Bath toy  
(3.4, 2.0) 
Back-left corner of 
bath [4] 
(1.3, .6) 
Toilet lid 
(7.7, 2.7) 
Sink 
(8.3, 1.4) 
2. Shampoo 
(1.2, .6) 
Front-left corner of 
bath [0] 
(1.1, .3) 
Top of clothes-
drier 
(8.4, 1.5) 
Floor next to sink 
(7.5, 2.4) 
3. Toilet Roll 
(1.1, .3) 
Left end of cistern 
[2] 
(1.2, .4) 
On bath taps 
(8.3, 2.1) 
Sink, right side of 
taps 
(6.7, 2.7) 
4. Mouthwash 
(1.5, .8) 
Window-ledge 
above sink [4] 
(1.3, .8) 
Bathmat 
(9.3, 1.2) 
Toilet lid 
(9.1, 1.7) 
5. Scales 
(2.5, .6) 
Floor between sink 
and toilet [9] 
(1.5, 1.0) 
Sink behind taps 
(9.4, .8) 
Back/middle of 
bath 
(9.7, .6) 
6. Toilet Brush 
(1.2, .4) 
Floor on right of 
toilet [7] 
(1.0, 0) 
Floor, side of 
shower 
(7.3, 2.6) 
Floor, side of bath 
(8.3, 1.7) 
7. Clock 
(6.5, 2.8) 
- Bathmat (back) Window-ledge 
8. Notebook 
(8.2, 1.5) 
- Bathmat (front) Front side of bath 
9. Handbag 
(8.3, 1.6) 
- Front side of bath Floor in front of 
bathmat 
10. Bikelight 
(8.8, 2.4) 
- Left-front of 
bathmat 
Right side of 
window-ledge 
11. Yoga Block 
(6.1, 3.2) 
- Top of clothes-
drier 
Floor under 
clothes-drier 
12. Nutcracker 
(8.6, 1.5) 
- Front edge of bath Back wall (stuck 
on) 
Kitchen 
1. Microwave 
(1.2, .6) 
Shelf [0] 
(2.2, 1.7) 
Floor, back 
(9.5, 1.7) 
Table, near wall 
(5.3, 2.7) 
2. Kitchen Roll 
(1.4, 1.0) 
Work-surface right 
of sink [1] 
(1.0, 0) 
Floor, back right 
(9.5, 1.0) 
Stove, front left 
(8.7, 1.6) 
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3. Metal pan 
(1.0, 0) 
Stove, front left [6] 
(1.0, 0) 
Stool 
(9.2, 1.0) 
Floor near stool 
(9.2, 1.5) 
4. Toaster 
(1.0, 0) 
Work surface right 
of sink [4] 
(1.1, .3) 
Hook on wall 
above calendar 
(9.9, .3) 
Floor near stove 
(9.3, 1.1) 
5. Fruitbowl 
(1.9, 1.2) 
Table [11] 
(1.1, .3) 
Sink 
(6.6, 2.7) 
Foot-shelf of table 
(6.3, 2.7) 
6. Green teapot 
(1.8, 1.1) 
Work surface right 
of sink [2] 
(1.1, .3) 
Foot-shelf of table 
(7.8, 2.5) 
Stool 
(8.8, 1.3) 
7. Walking boots 
(7.9, 1.8) 
- Middle-right of 
floor 
Work-surface left 
of sink 
8. Bathtowel 
(8.4, 2.5) 
- Rail of table Back of stool 
9. Toy 
(8.5, 1.6)  
- Worksurface to left 
of stove 
Window-ledge 
10. Pile of books 
(6.2, 2.4) 
- Floor near stool Window-ledge 
11. Umbrella 
(7.7, 1.6) 
- Back of Stool near 
wall 
Floor behind table 
12. Hat 
(8.2, 1.2) 
- Table Pinboard next to 
windowledge 
Living Room 
1. TV 
(1.5, 1.2) 
Shelf [10] 
(1.4, .9) 
Floor near shelves 
(7.5, 2.4) 
Sofa 
(9.3, 1.1) 
2. Painting of 
beach 
(1.6, .8) 
Wall above 
mantelpiece [10] 
(1.1, .3) 
Hearth 
(7.6, 2.7) 
French window 
(8.2, 2.9) 
3. Paper lamp 
(2.3, 1.1) 
Sidetable near 
shelves [0] 
(3.3, 2.5) 
Mantelpiece 
(3.3, 2.5) 
 
Floor near French 
window 
(5.2, 3.1) 
4. Hi-Fi 
(2.7, 1.1) 
Shelf [0] 
(1.3, .5) 
Near French 
window 
(6.6, 2.6) 
Log-basket 
(9.6, .8) 
5. Photos in frame 
(1.7, 1.1) 
Shelf [1] 
(1.1, .3) 
Floor near rocking 
chair 
(9.4, .8) 
Hearth 
(7.0, 3.0) 
6. Vase with 
flowers 
(2.2, 1.0) 
Sidetable near sofa 
[0] 
(1.3, .5) 
Sofa 
(9.1, 1.1) 
Rocking chair 
(9.1, 1.5) 
7. Doll 
(4.2, 1.2) 
- Shelf Lower shelf of 
sidetable near sofa 
8. Stripey bed 
pillow 
(4.1, 2.2) 
- Back of rocking 
chair 
Lower shelf of 
sidetable near sofa 
9. Sandals 
(6.3, 2.4) 
- Floor near hearth Shelf 
10. Trowel 
(9.2, 1.5) 
- Floor near hearth Hearth 
11. Gold rubber  Mantelpiece Floor near rocking 
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duck 
(8.6, 2.1) 
chair 
12. Blue cardboard 
castle 
(6.5, 1.8) 
- Top shelf Floor near sofa 
Office 
1. Bin 
(1.3, .6) 
Floor near desk [5] 
(1.6, 1.5) 
Near end of desk 
(7.8, 1.9) 
Top of filing 
cabinet 
(8.3, 2.1) 
2. Lap-top 
(1.2, .4) 
Far end of desk [0] 
(1.3, .6) 
Floor, near middle 
end of desk 
(9.1, 1.8) 
Top of boxes near 
filing cabinet 
(7.8, 2.1) 
3. Lamp 
(1.4, .8) 
Far end of desk [0] 
(1.1, .3) 
On chair round the 
table 
(9.4, .7) 
Under chair round 
the table 
(9.6, .5) 
4. Printer 
(1.4, .9) 
Middle end, desk 
[3] 
(1.0, 0) 
Table 
(5.5, 2.5) 
Chair round table 
(9.2, 1.0) 
5. Desk-Chair 
(1.0, 1.0) 
Next to far end of 
desk [0] 
(1.5, .9) 
At table 
(4.8, 2.6) 
Middle of floor 
(5.8, 2.8) 
6. ‘Phone 
(1.2, .4) 
Middle end, desk 
[8] 
(1.0, 0) 
On chair 
(9.3, .8) 
Under chair 
(9.7, .7) 
7. Carafe 
(7.6, 2.2) 
- Top of filing 
cabinet 
Table 
8. Yogamat 
(7.3, 2.6) 
- Floor Chair 
9. Climbing shoes 
(6.3, 2.0) 
- Near end of desk Floor 
10. Green cushion 
(6.0, 1.8) 
- Floor near filing 
cabinet 
Far end of desk 
11. Police Helmet 
(9.3, 1.5) 
- Near end of desk Table 
12. Red Kettle 
(3.2, 1.3)  
- Floor, foreground Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Top panel: Version 2 of the kitchen scene (see Figure S1) using objects 7.-
9. as schema-irrelevant objects, and using list 2 unexpected locations.  Middle panel: 
One of the possible test images (out of 2) associated with the study image depicted in 
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the top panel used in Study 1 (shift-to-expected condition).  Bottom panel: Example 
of a participant’s responses, having originally studied the image in the top panel, in 
the recall task of Study 2. Note.  Schema-relevant objects in expected places at study 
are the pan and toaster, those in unexpected places are microwave and teapot, and 
those not present are fruitbowl and kitchen roll.  
Figure 2. Numbers of different types of target objects and foils used for the study phase, and in the associated recognition test photograph in 
Study 1. This scheme was the same for each of the 4 scenes, bathroom, kitchen, living room and office, utilized in Study 1.
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Figure 3. Mean percentage of Yes responses (and SEs) for schema-relevant objects at 
expected and unexpected locations, as well as schema-irrelevant objects, both present 
and absent during original study, in Study 1 (the Shift-to-Expected condition above, 
and the Shift-to-Unexpected condition below). Note. Responding Yes is correct for 
target objects that were present at study, and incorrect for foils that were not present. 
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Figure 4.  Mean percentage (and SEs) of correct responses (i.e. a “no” response to the 
question “was this object in this place before”) as a function of whether objects were 
originally in schema-expected locations (shifted to unexpected locations in test 
photographs), schema-unexpected locations (shifted either to expected locations or 
different unexpected locations depending on condition), or were schema-irrelevant 
(shifted from one location to a different location), in Study 1. Black bars represent the 
“Shift-to-Expected” condition, and white bars the “Shift-to-Unexpected” condition. 
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Figure 5.  Mean percentage (and SEs) of correct object recognition (black bars) and 
mean percentage of correct placement (white bars) as a function of whether the 
schema-relevant objects were studied at expected and unexpected locations, and 
whether the object was schema-irrelevant, in Study 2. 
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Figure 6.  Mean percentage (and SEs) of correct object recognition (above) and mean 
percentage of correct placement (below) as a function of whether the schema-relevant 
objects were studied at expected and unexpected locations, and whether the object 
was schema-irrelevant, in the reanalysis of Study 2, the replication of Study 3 and the 
pooled data.  Note that N = 31 in the Study 2 reanalysis for location recall proportion, 
as one participant did not recognise any schema-relevant objects viewed in 
unexpected locations correctly across the 4 room scenes. 
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Figure 7. Mean percentage (and SEs) of falsely recognised foil objects as a function 
of whether they were schema-relevant or irrelevant, in the re-analysis of Study 2, the 
replication of Study 3, and the pooled data. 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
"f
a
ls
e
"r
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n Study121re<analysis
Study131replication
Studies121&131
pooled
